Disinformation in the Brazilian pre-election context: probing the content, spread and implications of fake news about Lula da Silva by Dourado, Tatiana & Salgado, Susana
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gcrv20
The Communication Review
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gcrv20
Disinformation in the Brazilian pre-election
context: probing the content, spread and
implications of fake news about Lula da Silva
Tatiana Dourado & Susana Salgado
To cite this article: Tatiana Dourado & Susana Salgado (2021): Disinformation in the Brazilian pre-
election context: probing the content, spread and implications of fake news about Lula da Silva, The
Communication Review, DOI: 10.1080/10714421.2021.1981705
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2021.1981705
© 2021 The Author(s). Published with
license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Published online: 05 Oct 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Disinformation in the Brazilian pre-election context:
probing the content, spread and implications of fake news
about Lula da Silva
Tatiana Douradoa and Susana Salgado b
aDepartment of Public Policy Analysis of Fundação Getulio Vargas, National Institute of Science and
Technology in Digital Democracy, Rio De Janeiro, Botafogo, Brazil; bInstitute of Social Sciences,
University of Lisbon, Lisboa, Portugal
ABSTRACT
This research scrutinizes the content, spread, and implications of
disinformation in Brazil’s 2018 pre-election period. It focuses
specifically on the most widely shared fake news about Lula
da Silva and links these with the preexisting polarization and
political radicalization, ascertaining the role of context. The
research relied on a case study and mixed-methods approach
that combined an online data collection of content, spread,
propagators, and interactions’ analyses, with in-depth analysis
of the meaning of such fake news. The results show that the
most successful fake news about Lula capitalized on prior hosti-
lity toward him, several originated or were spread by conserva-
tive right-wing politicians and mainstream journalists, and that
the pro-Lula fake news circulated in smaller networks and had
overall less global reach. Facebook and WhatsApp were the






The current connotation of fake news has emerged as part of a disinterme-
diated and fragmented social media environment and in a context of low trust
in political institutions (Chadwick, 2013; Hermida, 2010; Humprecht, 2018;
Salgado, 2018 ; Van Aelst et al., 2017). In addition to social media’s wide use,
crisis, political polarization, radicalization, and instability are fertile ground
for fake news production and propagation (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Del
Vicario et al., 2016). Such context-dependent conditions encourage viral
dissemination (Venturini, Bounegru, Gray, & Rogers, 2018) and legitimize a
battle of narratives (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Marda & Milan, 2018) based
on harmful content, hate speech, conspiracy, bullshit, rumors, and lies, often
similar to fake news. Lewandowsky et al. (2017) go further linking the rein-
forcement of radical and extremist political movements with the decline of
social capital and trust in science, growing inequality, the rise of political
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polarization and the increasing importance of social media in media environ-
ments, all of which linked to fake news. The decline of trust in professional
news media also explains why fake news became so popular so quickly nowa-
days (McChesney, 2012).
Our approach seeks to contribute to the understanding of the Brazilian
online disinformation environment, by studying the content, spread, and
implications of fake news about Lula da Silva. In the 2018 pre-election period,
fake news blended with political propaganda and actual news, which made it
often impossible for common citizens to distinguish between facts and lies and
to uncover the real intentions behind the spread of fake information. This was
particularly important in the case of former President Lula da Silva, because a
considerable part of society did not approve of his intention to re-run for the
2018 election. Lula da Silva provoked extreme feelings among the population,
either love or hate, and was considered the main target of fake news in Brazil
(Bergamasco, Aguiar, & De Campos, 2018).
This research is thus guided by an exploratory research question: To what
extent and in what ways has political context impacted on the production and
distribution of fake news about Lula da Silva? It analyses the fake news items that
circulated about Lula da Silva focusing on three dimensions: 1) Content, to check
format, sources, topics, and political actors; 2) Spread, to see how content spreads
through different platforms and the role of specific propagators; 3) Implications
and connections to reality, to examine the links between the actual political
context and fake news with the objective of further understanding the emergence
and the distribution of such falsehoods, as well their impact on politics.
This approach differentiates from extant research more focused on audi-
ences (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess, Lyons, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2018;
Nelson & Taneja, 2018; Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2018), or on the
technological affordances, including algorithms and bots (e.g., Howard,
Bolsover, & Bradshaw, 2017; Spohr, 2017), and focuses instead primarily on
the role of context (e.g., Humprecht, 2018; Jankowski, 2018), by following a
case study approach that examines the links between fake news on Lula da
Silva and Brazil’s political context.
The article is divided in four main sections, plus this Introduction. It starts
with the theoretical underpinning of our approach. Then, the next section
explains the research design and methodological options. The Results section
explains the further details of the analysis and its main results, which are
finally discussed at the light of the “context-matters” notion.
Fake news in politics
Fake news is a multifaceted and dynamic phenomenon; it develops according
to technology and globalization levels, country-specific, political, social, and
cultural factors (e.g., Humprecht, 2018). Extant literature places it within the
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wider context of disinformation that encompasses “fake news, rumors, delib-
erately factually incorrect information, politically slanted information, and
hyperpartisan news” (Tucker at al., 2018: 2). Fake news stories often display
the following components: 1) news appearance, 2) fictitious source, 3) viral
reach, d) intentionality, 4) verifiable falsehood and 5) potential to generate
deception (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2018).
Online deceptive content has been gaining ground in recent years, partly
due to the growth of far-right populism and other political extremisms and to
the growing use of social media (Araújo & Prior, 2021; Baldwin-Philippi, 2019;
Bimber, 2015; Ibsen, 2019; Salgado, 2018). Both the structure and use of social
media have amplified hyper-partisanship, confrontation, antagonism, and
social divisionism by propelling the creation of like-minded online commu-
nities, which are then highly fragmented among each other due to their
different ideologies, ideas, beliefs, agendas, and actors. Polarization is particu-
larly important as it refers to a division into contrasting groups or opinions
(the us versus them), which has a relational nature and an instrumental
political use (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018). It is, furthermore, a contin-
uous process that strengthens dispute, division, conflict, and social intolerance
(Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).
Studies have seek to understand how partisan and affective political polar-
ization relates to online environments, particularly those in which the circula-
tion and wide sharing of deceptive content is of concern (e.g., Iyengar, Sood, &
Lelkes, 2012; Narayanan, Barash, Kollanyi, Neudert, & Howard, 2018; Rojas &
Valenzuela, 2019), and found that rumors and falsehoods tend to spread faster
in polarized online networks (e.g., Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau,
2015; Friggeri, Adamic, Eakles, & Cheng, 2014; Törnberg, 2018). Moreover,
right-wing conservatives have been found more likely to share or engage in
fake news stories (e.g., Grinberg, Joseph, Friedland, Swire-Thompson, &
Lazer, 2019) and “sharing fake news is often linked to self-presentation and
reinforcement of group identity” (Marwick, 2018: 477). Some adverse con-
sequences include sowing division among different social and cultural groups,
or distracting and confusing, to chip away at the minimal shared understand-
ings required for political discussion (Chadwick & Vaccari, 2019: 7). The
specific context does seem to hold an important role, not only in the propaga-
tion potential of messages produced and distributed online, but also in the
acceptance or resistance to fake news.
Fake news stories can be seen as products of today’s complex political
communication processes and placed within a specific political context (e.g.,
Salgado, 2019) that mediates their production, spread and endorsement.
Moreover, the spread of fake news is often related to specific political goals
(e.g., obtain leverage over opponents to win an election, etc.) and sometimes
entails cherry-picking truthful aspects of reality and mixing them with false-
hoods (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Pyrhönen & Bauvois, 2020) to amplify
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impact. The incorporation of fake news in political strategies also aims to take
advantage of preexisting climates of opinion, when they are seen as accom-
modative of a given agenda and bias, to boost their potential for online virality
through cross-platform spread. In this sense, the success of fake news is largely
dependent on the political environment.
The Brazilian context is particularly prolific for research about these issues.
Brazil has experienced several political crises in its recent history. The series of
massive popular demonstrations that happened throughout Brazil in 2013,
which became known as “June Journeys” (e.g., Mendonça & Bustamante,
2020; Santos, 2019; Singer, 2014), instigated the demonstration of feelings of
dissatisfaction among the population and against the institutions of represen-
tative democracy. This paved the way for the emergence of groups calling for
the denial of party politics and seeking a return to military dictatorship. This
political upheaval was reflected in the 2014 election, in which Dilma Rousseff
(PT–Workers Party) won by just 3,28%. The growing climate of antipathy
toward the PT, called “antipetism” (Davis & Straubhaar, 2020), escalated when
Rousseff’s opponents questioned the 2014 electoral results.“Antipetism” is also
key in understanding Rousseff’s impeachment and Jair Bolsonaro’s victory in
the 2018 presidential election (a politician, who retired from the military and
ran for office in the 2018 election with the support of the right-wing, con-
servative political party Social Liberal Party, PSL). Such political instability
worsened distrust and boosted the use of social media to spread rumors and
fake news with the purpose of influencing the already unstable climates of
opinion.
Research has found that crises of trust in democracy tend to amplify
adherence to conspiracy theories (e.g., Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017;
Hendricks & Vestergaard, 2019). Furthermore, the more competitive the
election, the more influence the flows of information will potentially have on
voters, including those that are fake news, particularly if we take into account
that they are often shared among users who perceive them as true news, either
because they trust the sender or because the content resembles a real news
story, or both. For the purpose of this research, we have thus collected and
analyzed fake news that did resemble actual news (see also Al-Rawi, 2019;
Tandoc et al., 2018), that distorted political facts, that were verified and
deemed false by fact-checking endeavors, and that were spread primarily
online.
Methodological approach
Empirical research addressing context can contribute to the further under-
standing of the underlying motivations of spreading fake news and their actual
impact and thus to cumulative knowledge on how this phenomenon unfolds
in different cases. Our exploratory approach examines the main characteristics
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of fake news about Lula da Silva in an electoral context. The working hypoth-
esis is that fake news disseminated amid climates of hostile and polarized
opinions and that capitalize on actual facts by distorting them are spread
quickly and broadly through diverse online platforms.
Our case study is based on a mixed-methods approach that includes web
data collection and analysis (Bounegru, Gray, Venturini, & Mauri, 2017;
Rogers, 2017) and qualitative content analysis, which is used to examine and
describe meaning in a systematic manner (Schreier, 2012; Krippendorff, 2019).
As Schreier explains, it allows that the researcher “engages in some degree of
interpretation to arrive at the meaning of the data” (Schreier, 2012: 2). The
data collection comprised the archives of fact-checking initiatives and web
browsing on the relevant websites and social media platforms: we traced fake
news about Lula da Silva that circulated during the pre-campaign period and
then identified the profiles, accounts, pages, and platforms associated to those
occurrences. The research steps are described next.
We first probed the Brazilian online environment to find occurrences (i.e.,
fake news about Lula da Silva) and collect their full content. Through this
initial procedure, we found that fact-checking initiatives (a comprehensive list
is provided in the Appendix) were important secondary data sources, as they
kept updated records of all occurrences, which has allowed us to check the
content and format of all fake news about Lula da Silva. Other relevant
websites (please see the Appendix) were also used as data sources, as they
played a role in producing and distributing these fake news items. In Lula da
Silva’s case, most fake news circulated on Facebook, WhatsApp and, slightly
less, on Twitter. We collected and mapped the most widely shared fake news
through these platforms from January 1 to July 31, 2018, which corresponds to
an extended pre-campaign period.
A dataset initially composed of 53 units included all items that had been
considered fake news by fact-checking initiatives. The months with the highest
volume of fake news in circulation about former President Lula da Silva were
April and July with 16 and 13 items, respectively. In April, Lula da Silva was
arrested on charges of corruption and in July a series of legal events that would
determine whether Lula could be a presidential candidate in the 2018 election
took place. Among the items that had been proven untrue, we then selected the
ones that had achieved wider circulation and reach through social media. To
guarantee consistency in the sample in its connection to the meaning of “fake
news” in our approach (i.e., similarity to actual news stories), we excluded all
content that could be confused with chain messages, satires and memes (ten
cases); stories that were checked by one fact-checking website only (twenty-
one cases); and stories that, even if checked more than once, had negligible
reach and triggered rather inconsequential levels of interaction among users
(four cases). Such conditions (verifiability, virality, similarity to actual news)
provide greater likelihood that the false content would become “fact” and
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“information” in the voters’ opinion. Virality here means the widespread of
content in online environments (Berger & Milkman, 2012; Nahon & Hemsley,
2013). The final sample for in-depth analysis was composed of eighteen units
of analysis (N = 18) representing 459.096 digital interactions. Table 1 provides
a summary.
The repercussions triggered by each of these items were also taken into
account. Further web searches allowed the detection of the source and the
main propagators in each of these eighteen fake news items. Online searches
using excerpts of the fake news’s original content (retrieved from fact-
checking websites) were performed on Facebook, Twitter, and Google. On
WhatsApp, because it is a closed messenger with end-to-end encryption, the
search was done through secondary sources as fact-checking initiatives and
other (open) social media platforms when there was evidence disclosing the
fake news’s actual trajectory. This means that WhatsApp specific data was
considered only when secondary sources (e.g., fact-checking websites) con-
firmed its relevance in the spread of a given fake news item. Although our
analysis did not identify specific propagators within WhatsApp (closed plat-
form), it did manage to collect the content of the items spread through
this app.
The social monitoring platform CrowdTangle extension was used to check
how many social media shares each item had triggered, i.e., which pages or
accounts had shared the specific link. This allowed the identification of key
propagators as well as the further data collection on relevant websites that
acted as producers and distributors of the fake news content. Iramuteq soft-
ware was then used for automated textual analysis that was combined with in-
Table 1. Final sample.
Date (2018) Headline Interactions
January 26 Judge Moro authorizes Lula’s detention 4.560
January 26 UN Secretary-General threatens Brazil due to Lula’s imprisonment 40.700
January 31 Housekeeper says Lula has cement safe-box deposit at home 8.177
February 1 Lula lied about a meeting in Ethiopia to flee the country 7.222
March 28 Police suspects that attack against Lula’s bus was simulated 37.122
March 28 Journalist confesses attack against Lula’s bus was simulated 36.850
April 4 The Pope defends Lula 53.216
April 14 Madonna wears PT t-shirt to support Lula 15.445
April 17 Gleisi asks Islamic State to release Lula 59.158
April 23 Lula’s son runs for president in the 2018 election 1.890
April 29 Hague Court recognizes Lula as political prisoner 15.315
May 1 Banks prohibit notes with “Free Lula” imprint 71.005
June 21 Lewandowski asks for secret session on Lula 42.814
July 11 Woman who provoked Bolsonaro is Lula’s daughter 17.195
July 11 Photo shows Lula with well-known judges 28.423
July 12 PT discloses plan for “Communist domination” 1.959
July 27 Poll results: Bolsonaro defeats Lula 13.330
July 30 Lula donated millions to terrorists 4.715
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depth (human) content analysis, focusing on the three main dimensions of the
analysis (derived from the research objectives) and ensuing six variables
(Table 2).
The first dimension dealt with the fake news’ content to assesses the
resemblance of fake news to regular news formats and the prevalence of
political polarization. The second dimension dealt with spread (online virality)
to investigate the trajectory of each fake news item and track the role of
propagators (profiles or pages). It is important to note that information on
specific individual users-propagators was disclosed only in the case of public
profiles of public figures, the remaining profiles were subjected to de-
identification procedures (pseudonymization). Because it was impossible to
collect all data from all users involved, the study focused on the four main
propagators only and on the interaction among users connected to them,
levels of engagement, and overall reach. The interaction/engagement rate1
calculations were thus based on the four main propagators for each fake
news item. The third dimension of analysis examined the fake news’s connec-
tion to reality both regarding its links to real facts (e.g., distortion vs. fabrica-
tion) and its repercussions on society.
Table 2. Overview of the analysis: dimensions and variables.
Dimensions Variables Description
Content 1.1 Polarization Does the fake news item reinforce political polarization (bias and radical
expressions)?




2.1 Reach – different
platforms
What are the specific trajectories of the fake news item’s propagation (e.g.,
distribution, propagators, type of account, and URLs)?
2.2 Impact on politics Has the fake news item interfered with offline politics?
Offline
reality
3.1 Facts Is the fake news item a direct reaction to a political event?
3.2 Preexistent
climates of opinion
Is the fake news item a result of preexisting climates of suspicion, conspiracy
or speculation?
Table 3. Main events.
Lula is sentenced to 12 years and 1 month in prison January 24
Justice rules seizure of Lula’s passport January 25
Lula’s caravan buses are attacked by gunmen March 12
Supreme Court rejects last appeal before Lula’s arrest and execution of sentence is authorized April 5
Former President Lula is arrested April 7
In video recorded for Al Jazeera, PT president says Lula is victim of political persecution April 18
PT supporters imprint #LulaLivre on banknotes May 2
Date of court session to decide request for freedom is announced June 22
Jair Bolsonaro involved in scandal at airport July 3
Judge orders Lula’s release, but decision is immediately overturned July 8
1This metric allows the calculation of the probability that a given content has of inducing interaction when it appears
on the user’s timeline. The calculation was done through a digital marketing formula (interactions: followersX100),
and then compared with the Facebook Engagement Rate Calculator tool (The Online Advertising Guide). Available
at: https://theonlineadvertisingguide.com/ad-calculators / facebook-engagement-rate-calculator/.
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These three dimensions uphold the empirical analysis of the links between
the production and spread of fake news and the preexisting political and media
contexts, to analyze whether/how context matters. By assessing the similarity
to real news and the prevalence of polarization in content, our approach
checks whether/how the content of fake news relates to specific features of
context. By checking the propagation channels, our approach acknowledges
the online environment’s structure and studies how the content spreads
through it. By examining if the fake news story had a meaningful impact on
offline politics, it stresses the interconnection between the disinformation
strategies and the political context. Finally, our approach establishes whether
there were clear connections between offline reality (facts and preexistent
climates of opinion) and fake news.
Results
Content
The first dimension focused on the similarity of fake news items to actual news
formats and on the prevalence of polarization, to ascertain the link between
fake news and political context. Polarization was assessed through the political
bias, the specific topic and actors mentioned in the fake news item, the
existence of a clear divide, and the use of harsh, pejorative language. The
political bias provides important information about the sender’s ideological
spectrum, which together with content often allows the inference of the
motivation behind the production and spread of a given fake news item.
Following Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), we coded the fake news items’ con-
tent between favorable (pro-Lula) and unfavorable (anti-Lula). Anti-Lula
refers to the content whose main objective was to harm Lula da Silva’s public
image and reversely pro-Lula content aimed to improve his reputation, pro-
mote his 2018 presidential candidacy, and defend him from accusations. Most
cases were clearly anti-Lula (fourteen in total) and only four were pro-Lula
(Figure 1).
The anti-Lula posts had at least 13.125.528 interactions (likes and other
emotional reactions, comments, and shares) and were mostly distributed in
conservative, right-wing networks, which comprised approximately
13.072.796 followers (100,40% engagement rate). The pro-Lula posts received
68.661 interactions from predominantly leftist networks involving 223.546
followers (30,71% engagement rate). These numbers indicate that the interac-
tion motivated by anti-Lula fake news was 190 times higher than the interac-
tion caused by pro-Lula items. In addition, untruths put into circulation that
could benefit the former president circulated through a network that was fifty-
eight times smaller. Interestingly, only two fake news items, both pro-Lula,
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were shared simultaneously by right and left networks, with 56.015 interac-
tions that spread through the pages and profiles of 290.008 users/followers
(19,31% engagement rate).
The lexical analysis assessed the prevalence of pejorative expressions and
incitements to intolerance against the political opponents. For this purpose,
we used Iramuteq software to analyze fake news items and posts by the main
propagators. The analysis showed that of 374 grammatical forms, many were
adjectives (98). Conspiracies, such as the “communist threat,” were found in
fourteen of the eighteen cases under analysis. The lexical analysis also showed
that there were several cases with swear words and that the terms “national,”
“terrorist,” “PT,” “communist” and “political” have appeared the most. For
example, in the item with the second highest interaction levels, Gleisi
Hoffmann (politician, chief of staff in Rousseff’s presidency) was called “com-
munist” and the Arab population was considered “terrorist.” In the case of the
woman who shouted at Bolsonaro and was later introduced as Lula’s daughter,
the fake news item said specifically: “Drunk Lula’s daughter cursing Bolsonaro.
The despair of the PT has begun.” In a fake news item related to the potential
victory of Bolsonaro in all states, one of its main propagators posted the
following comment: “The left will be extinguished. Swallow your cry,
communists.”
By focusing on format features and sources of information, the analysis
also examined how the fake news item emulated a real news story. These two
elements represent forms of ascribing credibility and legitimacy to an untrue
fact. We found four different types of format, with twenty occurrences,
because two of the cases had two predominant formats and not just one.
The most common, with seven occurrences, was the news article type,
followed by five items that consisted mainly of photos, four items that
included texts, images and videos, and four items with a short text format.
All of these followed patterns of journalistic production. When the fake news
Figure 1. Anti and Pro-Lula fake news stories’ interactions.
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emulated a real news article, it included headlines, journalistic jargon, and
sources of information. In addition to titles that simulated real news head-
lines, there was also the insertion of “Breaking News,” “Scoop,” or
“Exclusive” and photos to convey the impression that it was indeed fact-
related. The use of third-person sentences, direct and indirect quotes from
sources of information, or even “off-the-record” mentions, aim at embed-
ding the credibility of journalism’s formats into the fake news items, and
some of these elements were also found in posts. Publishing photos intends
to provide some additional evidence of the rumors and untruths put into
circulation.
Actual sources of information were included in eleven of these fake news
items and in four of them reputable mainstream news media were used to
increase the credibility of the alleged “news report.” In these cases, the French
newspaper Le Monde, and the Brazilian news outlets Globo and Antagonista
were cited as source of the information. Globo belongs to one of the most
important news media groups in Brazil and Antagonista is a partisan news
media (Levendusky, 2013) known for its often-polarized treatment of infor-
mation and bias against Lula da Silva and PT. Journalists were presented as the
news source in other cases; the Brazilian Central Bank, the United Nations,
and a polling company (Paraná Pesquisa) were also cited as sources to support
these “news reports.”
Spread
This dimension focused on the online spread and virality (i.e., the rapid and
wide circulation of a message from one online user to another; see e.g.
Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), namely the reach and distribution through
different platforms, the main propagators (the most influential boosters), as
well as the specific URLs. If we look at the circulation of fake news as a feature
of the political context that has been accentuated by the digital era (Marda &
Milan, 2018), it becomes essential to examine the online spread and reach.
Törnberg (2018) has also demonstrated a synergetic effect between virality and
polarization.
We first determined the platform in which the fake news item originated
and then identified all the secondary environments through which it had
circulated. Such procedure, however, does not allow definite conclusions
about the origin, because there were cases in which it was possible to detect
more than one primary source. These data were collected through online
searches, which included fact-checking derived data, Facebook, and Twitter.
Even though WhatsApp prevents data collection by external means (it is
protected with end-to-end encryption), it was included in the distribution
analysis whenever the fact-checking initiatives signaled that a fake news item
had been spread through it, but we did not measure reach or interaction
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directly through WhatsApp. Despite these constraints, the inclusion of
WhatsApp in the study was considered important, due to its large number
of users and to the role that it has in the spread of fake news.
The analysis has also shown that the platform that has contributed the most
to spread fake news was Facebook; it was the primary route in 60% and the
secondary in 22% of the cases. WhatsApp followed, being primary in 38% and
secondary in 33% of the cases. Twitter was the primary source in 5% of the
cases and secondary in 38%. Facebook andWhatsApp were thus primordial in
spreading fake news about Lula da Silva. The explanation for this lies partly in
the fact that these social media platforms have the most penetration in Brazil,
but the specific features of these platforms should also play a role, as Facebook
allows posting more information and therefore more details, andWhatsApp is
a truly interpersonal platform with wide acceptance in Brazil. The results also
revealed that the interactions around anti-Lula’s fake news occurred in a
network with more than thirteen million users and were 190 times higher
than pro-Lula interactions.
The analysis identified 59 profiles, pages, or groups on Facebook that played
the roles of primary or secondary propagators of fake news about Lula.
Eighteen of these propagators were anonymous users or influential journalists
or politicians. The remaining 41 main propagators were Facebook pages or
groups linked to supporters of different politicians, online movements, ideo-
logical groups, and hoax sites.
Pro-Lula fake news items (8.47% of the sample) were mostly propagated by
personal profiles. The majority of anti-Lula fake news (91.52%) were propa-
gated by a conservative right-wing network that also praised the military
regime and supported Jair Bolsonaro. The fake news item with the highest
spread and audience (Figure 2) was initially shared by the movement behind
the mobilization for the impeachment of former President Rousseff, the
“Movimento Brasil Livre” (MBL–Free Brazil Movement is a conservative
movement, often described as the “Brazilian Tea Party”). In this case, MBL
received 12.000 shares, 17.000 likes and other emotional reactions, and 1900
comments on Facebook. When it was shared through other platforms and
websites, such as “Eu vivo no Brasil,” “Bolsonéas,” or “Movimento Força
Brasileira,” it received at least 37.122 more interactions.
The hoax website “Pensa Brasil” was also a prominent propagator of fake
news about Lula da Silva. The content posted by “Pensa Brasil” on its Facebook
page was widely shared by other websites and Facebook pages, such as
“República de Curitiba,” “Movimento Força Brasileira,” or “Lula de novo,
NÃO,” and was disseminated through a network of almost one million
followers (981.184), motivating nearly 37.000 interactions.
The analysis also showed that Facebook profiles by individual users linked
to three different accounts were key in disseminating anti-Lula fake news. In
one case, three fake news items were produced and initially disseminated by
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the same user, a supporter of the 1964 military coup in Brazil. This profile had
at least 52.736 followers and the spread of Lula da Silva’s fake news stories
motivated nearly 1.201.600 interactions. A single post had one of the highest
engagement rates, 34.000 shares, 5500 likes, and 1200 comments.
Another important propagator was a website updated by the journalist and
political columnist Augusto Nunes, who claimed that Lula da Silva had
fabricated a meeting in Ethiopia to be able to flee the country. This content
was spread through a network composed of at least 2.045.673 followers.
Another case, in which it was claimed that the PT president had hired
terrorists to release Lula, was originally propagated by a right-wing digital
influencer’s Facebook page and was spread through 1.096.506 followers, moti-
vating around 32.000 shares, 12.000 likes and 3.900 comments.
Influential users are extremely important in these dissemination processes,
either as producers or simply as propagators, they confer visibility and often also
legitimacy to the fake content that is being conveyed. Therefore, we also checked
the participation of influential users throughout the dissemination processes.
Almost half of the cases that we have analyzed (six) had at least one public figure
disseminating the fake news. The intervention of public figures in these cases,
not only popularized the content, but it also legitimized it. In the cases under
analysis, we found well-known journalists, politicians, and digital influencers.
Furthermore, the dissemination of fake content by more than one central
propagator increased significantly the reach of these fake news. This happened
in the case of the anti-Lula fake news item that stated that PT officials had hired
terrorists to help Lula da Silva escape from prison, which was endorsed by
Brazilian politicians, such as Ana Amélia, Major Olímpio, Ronaldo Caiado,
Figure 2. Top reach, interaction, and engagement.
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Alexandre Frota and the youtuber and MBL’s activist Arthur do Val (known as
“Mamãe Falei”), who was elected state representative in São Paulo in 2018. The
same happened in some pro-Lula fake news items, such as those stating that the
UN was preparing sanctions to Brazil due to Lula da Silva’s imprisonment and
that Pope Francis was supportive of Lula, which were shared by prominent PT
party members, such as Gleisi Hoffmann and federal deputy Marco Maia.
Biased information websites also played a significant role in disseminating
these items: they were central in seven of the cases. The analysis of their
URLs revealed that they motivated around 833.728 online interactions
(727.172 on Facebook) and circulated in networks of at least 15.095.897
users. Two of the fake news items originated on a website called “Diário
do Brasil” that clearly simulates a news portal. Other important means of
dissemination of fake news were the hoax websites “O Detective” and “Pensa
Brasil.” The latter resembles a news media outlet, but does not include any
names of its editorial board and journalists. There are also examples of
websites that position themselves as “alternative news media” and emulate
actual news media outlets, but that are clearly aligned ideologically with
right-wing movements, such as “Diário Nacional,” which is linked to MBL
(Free Brazil Movement) and “Jornal do País.” In addition to these, an actual
mainstream media, newsmagazine Veja, also appeared in the analysis as
involved (through a political column by one of its journalists) in the spread
of fake news about Lula da Silva.
We were also interested in checking whether these fake news items had
caused a noticeable impact on offline politics, namely if any political, social or
legal decision-making had been carried out as result of the acceptance or as
repercussion of these untrue reports. Four cases provoked direct political
impacts (in the sense of concrete actions). In the remaining fourteen cases,
other repercussions, related to an indirect impact, were also observed, such as
the rumor that banks would not accept banknotes with the “Free Lula” imprint
(71.005 interactions on Facebook). Direct consequences on politics included the
formal investigations by the Attorney General’s Office due to rumors of a
violation of the National Security Law and Lula da Silva’s release from prison
on a Sunday (rumors and images of the judge’s close relation with Lula were
widely spread and had an engagement rate of 45.37%). The episode that
originated from a rumor that Lula da Silva intended to flee the country caused
the seizure of his passport and he was prevented from participating in a FAO-
UN (Food and Agriculture Organization-United Nations) meeting in Ethiopia,
despite this having been previously authorized by the Justice Department
(please see a summary of the main events in Table 3).
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Connection to reality
This dimension examined the degree of closeness between the fake news’s
content and actual reality, especially those issues and events that are on the
public agenda. We expect that fake news deriving directly from reality or that
are closely inspired by actual facts will be more convincing and will cause
strong engagement.
The analysis has shown that most fake news items (thirteen: nine anti-Lula
and four pro-Lula) were closely inspired by real political events/facts. One of the
most influential after Lula’s arrest claimed that PT president Gleisi Hoffmann
had called terrorists from the Islamic State to release Lula da Silva from prison.
This content, which circulated among 1.096.506 followers and motivated nearly
60.000 interactions (5.40% engagement rate), was a direct reaction to a legitimate
video recorded by Hoffmann herself for Al Jazeera television channel in which
she stated that Lula da Silva was victim of political persecution.
All of the four pro-Lula fake news items were ingrained in real events. For
example, the actual seizure of Lula da Silva’s passport by the authorities
motivated two related fake news: one revealing that the UN Secretary-
General had threatened Brazil with sanctions, which triggered a considerably
high engagement rate (77.18%); and the report that Lula da Silva was planning
to attend the UN event to flee to Ethiopia (Ethiopia does not have an extra-
dition treaty in force with Brazil), which circulated through 2.045.673 users
and had at least 7.222 interactions (0.35% engagement rate).
The fake news items without connections to actual political events and facts
were all anti-Lula and were related to prior rumors and conspiracy theories.
These were aimed at intensifying the climate of hostility against Lula da Silva
and PT: in one case, a housekeeper had said that Lula da Silva had a cement safe-
deposit box larger than a swimming pool; another was a warning against “PT’s
domination plan”; and in another case, Lula da Silva had donated $25 million to
terrorists. The remaining two cases addressed the forthcoming 2018 election:
Lula had launched his son “Lulinha” as presidential candidate; and opinion polls
were predicting that Bolsonaro would win against Lula in all twenty-seven states.
Finally, we were interested in examining prior climates of opinion and their
possible connection to these fake news stories about Lula da Silva, more
specifically, whether fake news had emerged as a reflection of previously
shared opinions, suspicions, and speculations. This is also believed to amplify
the acceptance and reach of fake news, as it acts as reinforcement of ideas and
beliefs (for additional information on reinforcement in political campaigns
see, e.g., Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1997), as a
confirmation of information that had already been disseminated and assimi-
lated. We collected and analyzed further data focused on preexisting opinions
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and rumors pro and anti-Lula to check whether any of these had been used in
the fake news items. There was the construction of a narrative based on
preexisting speculations in six of the eighteen fake news items (Table 4).
Discussion
The expression fake news has been often used in a broader sense to refer to
everything that is not completely true (e.g., Farkas & Schou, 2018), but we do
acknowledge the usefulness of operationalizing it as a concept when studying
disinformation. For the purpose of empirical research, we have delimited the
concept to refer to cases of “news” that were intentionally fabricated, produced
to look like real news (although verified and considered false), and that were
spread through online platforms. We thus refer to political content dissemi-
nated as news, and not as political satire or opinion.
To add to knowledge about the global phenomena of politically oriented
fake news (Lazer et al., 2018), our approach focused on fake news about Lula
da Silva and explored the role that context plays in their production and
propagation. We analyzed the content, spread, and implications of fake news
to detect the actors behind their production, the characteristics of their con-
tent, their propagation trajectories throughout the media environments, and
their impact on offline politics. Such approach demonstrated the impact of a
polarized context (with the active participation of elected representatives and
of mainstream journalists) in fostering climates conducive to the spread of
fake news, some of which resulting from speculations and conspiracies already
Table 4. Prior climates of opinion.
Title Rumors
Judge Moro authorizes Lula’s
detention
There were rumors that Lula’s arrest would be confirmed long before it actually
happened.
Lula fabricated meeting in
Ethiopia to flee
Columnist raised the first suspicions in the article “Where is Lula’s passport?”
(Veja). Other columnists (Veja, Jovem Pan, TV Estadão) and bloggers
questioned the existence of a FAO-UN conference in Ethiopia, calling it “The
Ethiopian farce.”
Hague Court recognizes Lula as
political prisoner
Websites favorable to Lula had already published the rumor that the UN was
planning to consider Lula a political prisoner.2
Lula’s daughter confronts
Bolsonaro
Video started rumors that the woman’s identity had been revealed 3and that
she was a PT supporter.4
Picture of Lula with judges Members of the judiciary that had already been pointed as PT supporters and
Lula’s friends.
Lula donated millions to
terrorists
In 2010, Lula sanctioned a law allocating $25 million for the reconstruction of
the Gaza Strip. Since then, conservative groups and websites have conveyed
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present in online conversations and serving purposes of political manipula-
tion. The 2018 presidential election has further escalated a context of disin-
formation and misinformation, due to the systematic use of social media by
different types of actors (including mainstream politicians and journalists) to
spread fake news. Fake news stemmed from existing cycles of mis/disinforma-
tion in politics that were used in strategies to induce certain climates of
opinion with the goals of influencing political decisions, and even delegitimiz-
ing and overthrowing opponents.
The preexisting climate of hostility and strong political polarization has
influenced not only the volume of messages about Lula da Silva (many of these
focused on his credibility and character), but also the actors that initiated those
fake news stories: they were clearly anti or pro-Lula. The data analysis showed
that the most popular fake news items circulating during the pre-election
period were anti-Lula, with 13.125.528 interactions and 13.072.796 followers,
versus 68.661 interactions and 223.546 followers in the pro-Lula’s items. This
suggests that conservative online networks are larger and/or more engaged
online, which impacts on the fake news stories that thrive more easily. In a
hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013), with both news media coverage and
the use of social media by journalists, this escalated the climate of political
tension and discredit of PT and the left, which culminated in the electoral
victory of the right-wing populist candidate Jair Bolsonaro.
The analysis of fake news also showed that the resort to journalistic lan-
guage and procedures is common even in the case of messages conveyed
mainly through images and videos (the news-like dimension of analysis).
The similarity of fake news with actual news articles is intended to legitimize
the content through the credibility of journalistic work and makes false
information more believable in the eyes of the public, thus gaining wider
visibility and repercussion. Additionally, the strategy to build fake news stories
from preexisting concrete true facts and events is aimed at coating falsehoods
with a hint of reality, in order to activate reinforcement, which tends to
enhance influence. We observed this strategy in some fake news, which
might explain – at least in part – their online virality. In fact, all of these
features of fake news contribute to explain their spread and virality . And
context is key: in Brazil’s case not only there was already a climate of hostility
against PT and Lula da Silva, but also Lula was one of the most debated
“topics” of the pre-election period, due to his intention to re-run as presiden-
tial candidate in the 2018 election, despite the allegations of corruption and his
arrest. Fake news items have emerged and blended in a specific context of
affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012; Suhay, Bello-Pardo, & Maurer,
2018), in which sentiments such as fear, repulsion, hatred, anger, or idolatry
were exacerbated, thus facilitating propagation by users. Fake news stories
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about Lula da Silva have functioned as meaningful syntheses incorporating
preexisting narratives, which were linked to polarization and to the influential,
conservative media ecosystem (Garrett, Long, & Jeong, 2019).
The data analysis revealed that Lula’s opponents were more successful in
their use of fake news to influence the election campaign and Lula’s public
credibility. In terms of spread and impact on politics, the most successful
fake news items that circulated during the pre-election period were anti-
Lula. These were initiated by conservative right-wing individuals and groups
that extolled the virtues of the military (capitalizing on Brazil’s lack of
security issue) and praised Judge Moro who ruled for Lula da Silva’s arrest
before the presidential election. Internet users who supported these views
formed a network of at least thirteen millions. Ordinary citizens and anon-
ymity also play an important role; in this case, anonymous profiles were true
engines for the spread of fake news about Lula da Silva. And when public
figures endorsed a specific fake news, they gave it both credibility and
visibility.
Confirming extant research that points to the importance of the message
source in the propagation of fake news (e.g., Buchanan & Benson, 2019),
our approach demonstrated how some well-known journalists, who are
followed by readers and by other media professionals, sometimes took
themselves the role of propagating agents, which very likely explains the
higher impact of anti-Lula fake news items, as they were propagated in
larger and more powerful networks than pro-Lula fake news items. This is
all the more important, as previous studies have also shown how some
influential news media outlets have a clear partisan, anti-left, approach to
politics in Brazil (e.g., Albuquerque, 2016) and that the relation between
press and politics in Brazil does bear an important influence on political
action, as it happened in Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 (Albuquerque,
2017). Such finding seems to challenge research that deals with fake news as
naturally opposed to news media (e.g., Al-Rawi, 2019) and support the
approaches that include journalists and journalism in the equation (e.g.,
Curran and Seaton, 2010; van Dijck & Poell, 2013).
These fake news items emerged in a preexisting context of disinformation
and could be seen as tactics to radicalize and polarize the political environment
further, especially when endorsed by prominent public figures, including
journalists and politicians that strategically spread the fake news content to
mobilize supporters for their side. This case also shows how disinformation
can become misinformation if it is picked up and spread by individual users
without knowledge of whether the content is fake, where it originated, and
with what purpose. As in other settings (see e.g., Bennett & Livingston, 2018;
Lewis & Marwick, 2017), disinformation and misinformation became more
and more intertwined.
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The research results have emphasized the links between fake news and
context, which appears as influential in both their production and propaga-
tion. An approach such as this adds to knowledge on the interplay between
politics and media and between disinformation and polarization in the
Brazilian context and informs the state-of-the-art about how context shapes
these developments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by the Funda??o para a Ci?ncia e a Tecnologia [PTDC/CPO-CPO





Albuquerque, A. (2016). Voters against public opinion: The press and democracy in Brazil and
South Africa. International Journal of Communication, 10, 3042–3061.
Albuquerque, A. (2017). Protecting democracy or conspiring against it? Media and politics in
Latin America: A glimpse from Brazil. Journalism, 20(7), 906–923. doi:10.1177/
1464884917738376
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. doi:10.1257/jep.31.2.211
Al-Rawi, A. (2019). Gatekeeping Fake News Discourses on Mainstream Media Versus Social
Media. Social Science Computer Review, 37(6): 687–704
Araújo, B., & Prior, H. (2021). Framing political populism: The role of media in framing the
election of Jair Bolsonaro. Journalism Practice, 15(2), 226–242. doi:10.1080/
17512786.2019.1709881
Baldwin-Philippi, J. (2019). The technological performance of populism. New Media & Society,
2(2), 376–397. doi:10.1177/1461444818797591
Barberá, P., Jost, J., Nagler, J., Tucker, J., & Bonneau, R. (2015). Tweeting from left to right: Is
online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychological Science, 26(10),
1531–1542. doi:10.1177/0956797615594620
Bennett, W. L., & Livingston, S. (2018). The disinformation order: Disruptive communication
and the decline of democratic institutions. European Journal of Communication, 33(2),
122–139. doi:10.1177/0267323118760317
18 T. DOURADO AND S. SALGADO
Bergamasco, D., Aguiar, I., & De Campos, J. P. (2018). Lula, Temer e Moro são os maiores
alvos de notícias falsas | VEJA.com. Retrieved January 12, 2018, from Revista Veja website:
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ranking-alvos-vitimas-noticias-falsas-fake-news-politica-
brasil/
Berger, J., & Milkman, K. (2012). What makes online content viral? Strategic Direction, 28(8),
sd.2012.05628haa.014. doi:10.1108/sd.2012.05628haa.014
Bimber, B. (2015). The internet and political transformation: Populism, community and
accelerated pluralism. Polity, 31(n. 1), 133–160. doi:10.2307/3235370
Bounegru, L., Gray, J., Venturini, T., & Mauri, M. (2017). A field to guide to fake news - A
collection of recipes for those who love to cook with digital methods. Retrieved from http://
fakenews.publicdatalab.org
Buchanan, T., & Benson, V. (2019). Spreading disinformation on facebook: Do trust in message
source, risk propensity, or personality affect the organic reach of “fake news”? Social Media +
Society, 5(4), 205630511988865. doi:10.1177/2056305119888654
Chadwick, A. (2013). The hybrid media system. Politics and power. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Chadwick, A., & Vaccari, C. (2019). News sharing on UK social media: Misinformation,
disinformation, and correction. Retrieved from <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/
37720Version:>.
Curran, J., Seaton, J. (2010). Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the
Internet in Britain. London: Routledge
Davis, S., & Straubhaar, J. (2020). Producing antipetismo: Media activism and the rise of the
radical, nationalist right in contemporary Brazil. International Communication Gazette, 82
(1), 82–100. doi:10.1177/1748048519880731
Del Vicario, M., Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Petroni, F., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., . . . Quattrociocchi, W.
(2016). The spreading of misinformation online. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 113(3), 554–559. doi:10.1073/pnas.1517441113
Farkas, J., Schou, J. (2018). Fake News as a Floating Signifier: Hegemony, Antagonism, and the
Politics of Falsehood. Javnost - The Public, 25(3): 298–314
Friggeri, A., Adamic, L., Eakles, D., & Cheng, J. (2014). Rumor Cascades. Eighth International
AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media Adrien. Ann Harbor, Michigan, USA.
Garrett, R., Long, J. A., & Jeong, M. S. (2019). From partisan media to misperception: Affective
polarization as mediator. Journal of Communication, 69(5), 490–512. doi:10.1093/joc/jqz028
Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, B., & Lazer, D. (2019). Fake news on
Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Science, 363(6425), 374–378. doi:10.1126/
science.aau2706
Guess, A., Lyons, B., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2018). Avoiding the echo chamber about echo
chambers: Why selective exposure to like-minded political news is less prevalent than you
think. Retrieved from https://kf-site-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media_elements/files/
000/000/133/original/Topos_KF_White-Paper_Nyhan_V1.pdf
Hendricks, V., Vestergaard, M., (2019). Reality Lost: Markets of Attention, Misinformation,
and Manipulation. Cham: Springer
Hermida, A. (2010). Twittering the news: The emergence of ambient journalism. Journalism
Practice, 4(3), 297–308. doi:10.1080/17512781003640703
Howard, P. N., Bolsover, G., & Bradshaw, S. (March, 2017). Junk news and bots during the U.S.
Election: What were michigan voters sharing over twitter? COMPROP DATA MEMO.
Oxford, UK. 1–5.
Humprecht, E. (2018). Where fake news flourishes: A comparison across four Western
democracies. Information, Communication & Society, 22(13): 1973-1988. doi:10.1080/
1369118X.2018.1474241
THE COMMUNICATION REVIEW 19
Ibsen, M. F. (2019). The populist conjuncture: Legitimation crisis in the age of globalized
capitalism. Political Studies, 67(3), 795–811. doi:10.1177/0032321718810311
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on
polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3), 405–431. doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038
Jankowski, N. W. (2018). Researching fake news: A selective examination of empirical studies.
Javnost - The Public, 25(1–2), 248–255. doi:10.1080/13183222.2018.1418964
Johnson-Cartee, K., Copeland, G. (1997). Inside Political Campaigns: Theory and Practice.
Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger
Khaldarova, I., & Pantti, M. (2016). Fake news: The narrative battle over the Ukrainian conflict.
Journalism Practice, 10(7), 891–901. doi:10.1080/17512786.2016.1163237
Krippendorff, K. (2019). Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology. Los Angeles:
Sage. 4th edition
Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B., Gaudet, H. (1948). The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up
His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. New York: Columbia University Press
Lazer, D., Baum, M., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A., Greenhill, K., Menczer, F., . . . Zittrain, J. (2018).
The science of fake news. Science, 359Issue (6380), 1094–1096. doi:10.1126/science.aao2998
Levendusky, M. (2013). Why do partisan media polarize viewers? American Journal of Political
Science, 57(3): 611–623
Levitsky, S., Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U., Cook, J. (2017). Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and
Coping with the 'Post-Truth' Era. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6
(4): 353–369
Lewis, A., & Marwick, A. (2017). “Taking the red pill: Ideological motivations for spreading
online disinformation.” Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem, U.
of Pennsylvania Annenberg School for Communication, PA, December 15–16.
Marda, V., & Milan, S. (2018).Window of the crowd: Multistakeholder perspectives on the fake
news debate . Retrieved from http://compact-media.eu/wisdom-of-the-crowd-
multistakeholder-perspective-on-the-fake-news-debate/
Marwick, A. (2018). Why do people share fake news? A sociotechnical model of media effects.
Georgetown Law Technology Review, Vol. 2.2, 474–512
McChesney, R. W. (2012). Farewell to journalism? Journalism Practice, 6(5–6), 614–626.
doi:10.1080/17512786.2012.683273
McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the global crisis of democracy:
Common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic polities.
American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16–42. doi:10.1177/0002764218759576
Mendonça, R. F., & Bustamante, M. (2020). Back to the future: Changing repertoire in
contemporary protests. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 39(5), 629–643. doi:10.1111/
blar.13087
Narayanan, V., Barash, V., Kollanyi, B., Neudert, L.-M., & Howard, P. N. (2018). Polarization,
Partisanship and Junk News Consumption over Social Media in the US. COMPROP DATA
MEMO, Oxford, UK.
Nelson, J. L., & Taneja, H. (2018). The small, disloyal fake news audience: The role of audience
availability in fake news consumption. New Media & Society, 20(10), 3720–3737.
doi:10.1177/1461444818758715
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Prior exposure increases perceived
accuracy of fake news. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1–61. doi:10.1037/
xge0000465
Pyrhönen, N., & Bauvois, G. (2020). Conspiracies beyond fake news. Produsing reinformation
on presidential elections in the transnational hybrid media system. Sociological Inquiry, 90
(4), 705–731. doi:10.1111/soin.12339
20 T. DOURADO AND S. SALGADO
Rogers, R. (2017). Foundation of digital methods: Query design. In The datafied society:
Studying culture through data. Amsterdam University Press. doi:10.5117/9789462981362
Rojas, H., & Valenzuela, S. (2019). A call to contextualize public opinion-based research in
political communication. Political Communication, 36(4), 652–659. doi:10.1080/
10584609.2019.1670897
Salgado, S. (2018) Online media impact on politics. Views on post-truth politics and post-
postmodernism. International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 14(3):317–331.
doi:10.1386/macp.14.3.317_1x
Salgado, S. (2019). Never say never . . . Or the value of context in political communication
research. Political Communication, 36(4), 671–675. doi:10.1080/10584609.2019.1670902
Santos, N. (2019). The reconfiguration of the communication environment: Twitter in the 2013
Brazilian protests. [Thesis] Université Paris II- Panthéon-Assas École.
Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Singer, A. V. (2014). Rebellion in Brazil. New Left Review, 85, 19–37.
Spohr, D. (2017). Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and selective exposure
on social media. Business Information Review, 34(3), 150–160. doi:10.1177/
0266382117722446
Suhay, E., Bello-Pardo, E., & Maurer, B. (2018). B. The polarizing effects of online partisan
criticism: Evidence from two experiments. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(1),
95–115. doi:10.1177/1940161217740697
Tandoc, E. C., Lim, Z. W., & Ling, R. (2018). Defining “Fake News.” Digital Journalism, 6(2),
137–153. doi:10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143
Törnberg, P. (2018). Echo chambers and viral misinformation: Modeling fake news as complex
contagion. PLOS ONE, 13(n. 9), e0203958. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0203958
Tucker, J., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., Nyhan, B.
(2018). Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the
Scientific Literature. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144139
Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., De Vreese, C., Matthes, J., . . . Stanyer, J.
(2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: A challenge for
democracy? Annals of the International Communication Association, 41(1), 3–27.
doi:10.1080/23808985.2017.1288551
van Dijck, J., & Poell, T. (2013). Understanding social media logic.Media and Communication,
1(1), 2–14. doi:10.17645/mac.v1i1.70
Venturini, T., Bounegru, L., Gray, J., & Rogers, R. (2018). A reality check(-list) for digital
methods. New Media & Society, 20(11), 4195–4217. doi:10.1177/1461444818769236
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 1151
(6380), 1146–1151. doi:10.1126/science.aap9559
THE COMMUNICATION REVIEW 21
























Blog Augusto Nunes (Veja)
Social Media profiles, pages, groups:
Bolsonaro Presidente Sudoeste
Sergio Moro Brasil





Movimento Do POVO Brasileiro






Lula de novo, NÃO





Intervenção Antes Que Tardia – Curitiba
APOIO AO JUIZ SÉRGIO MORO & PROCURADOR DELTAN DALLAGNOL
Apoio à Operação Lava a Jato para deter a corrupção
22 T. DOURADO AND S. SALGADO
OndaVermelha







Por um Brasil Melhor
Bolsonaro Presidente, Brasil Sorridente
Grupo da Página Jair Bolsonaro Presidente 2018
OPERAÇÃO LAVA JATO EU APOIO AO JUIZ SERGIO MORO
Ordem Dourada Do Brasil
APOIO AO JUIZ SÉRGIO MORO E A OPERAÇÃO LAVA JATO
Somos Todos Sérgio Moro
EU APOIO O JUIZ SERGIO MORO E APOIO A POLÍCIA FEDERAL
To comply with ethical principles, personal profiles were not named.
THE COMMUNICATION REVIEW 23
